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Abstract
This article presents ideas about curriculum as a process in which people come 
together on an equal footing to explore ideas about how they might live and draw 
up plans about how they might do so. This is a negotiated process that recognizes 
the need of all to speak and be listened to, recognizing the historically constituted 
nature of social situations in different traditions, each with its own sets of culturally 
specific norms. Curriculum may then be seen as a process of everyday enquiry 
that may be conducted anywhere and by anyone, grounded in and informed by 
everyday practices.
Keywords: certainty and uncertainty, closure and emergence, curriculum as enquiry
Introduction
This article is an account of an ongoing action enquiry into how curriculum might 
be conceptualized as an inclusive, democratic process, what this might look like and 
how to ensure that it would be meaningful to learners as well as to teachers. From 
this perspective, curriculum could come to represent a means of personal and social 
hope, in that it helps learners to know what they need to know in order to navigate an 
unknowable future. Especially they can learn how to critique any unsatisfactory aspects 
in the current social order and develop strategies for combating and potentially 
changing them towards more satisfactory aspects for a more sustainable future. Further, 
given that all social change originates in people’s minds, in that individuals and groups 
need to decide what they wish to change and how they might do this, it falls to parents 
and teachers in schools, working collaboratively with the wider community, to imagine 
what any new order might look like and find ways of realizing their hopes. 
The article is structured in terms of the questions asked in a traditional action 
enquiry, as follows: 
 • What is the concern?
 • Why is it a concern?
 • How can the situation be shown in practice?
 • What can be done about it?
 • What might the outcomes be? 
 • What might be the significance of this approach to curriculum studies?
A key feature of action research is its emphasis on critique and change: if a situation 
is unsatisfactory to users, it can be changed, although users need to explain to 
themselves and others why they are changing things and what they hope to achieve 
by doing so. The change process may not be straightforward, but it can be done. This 
article contains ideas about how this might happen. 
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What is the concern?
The concern voiced here is in relation to how curriculum is currently understood in 
terms of its content (the ‘what’) and uses (the ‘what for?), and who controls decisions 
about such matters. Dominant views today in much of the developed world hold that 
curriculum should be understood in narrow, one-dimensional terms, comprising a 
definitive set of knowledges whose validity may be tested by means of establishing a 
cause and effect relationship – ‘If x, then y’, a strategy that has come to be known as ‘the 
scientific method’. This approach is also premised on the idea of certainty: ‘If I do this, 
that will probably happen’. Indeed, the very form of language used communicates this, 
as in ‘the scientific method’ (not ‘a scientific method’), and ‘experiments are controlled’ 
and involve ‘control groups’. The aim is to test the validity of an existing hypothesis. 
Further, in spite of its often having been used with wonderfully beneficial results, 
primarily in science and medicine, this scientific method can also act as a means of 
social control: think, for example, of forms of discourse such as ‘If you don’t do this, that 
will happen’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of the elites of contemporary intelligentsia, 
including traditionalist academics, self-serving politicians and business personnel, 
opt for this form, given that it usually acts in their interests, so they are committed 
to its perpetuation. Nothing new here: Toulmin (1990) explains how, historically, this 
approach has been created by the intelligentsia and passed on to be internalized 
by the common people, those allegedly passive, non-critical people, described by 
Walter Lippman (1922) as ‘the bewildered herd’. And these days, the elites are doing 
their job well: they are fulfilling their task that, in Lippman’s (ibid.) view, was to ensure 
that the situation remained as it was by providing and legitimizing appropriate kinds 
of knowledge for the public: ordinary people should stay bewildered in order to be 
compliant and biddable. 
Why is this a concern?
This view of curriculum as a set of approved knowledges remains the currently 
legitimized view (Apple, 1993; see also DfE, 2014). Consequently, it permeates all 
aspects of contemporary schooling and related contexts where teaching and learning 
are conducted officially. This point is of special concern, because, although the 
concept and practice of curriculum may be seen in general terms as the organization 
of knowledge and learning across a range of contexts – in factories and day centres, for 
example – its misuses are perhaps most damaging when deliberately used in relation 
to young people’s learning. 
To address these matters, first consider some of the core assumptions that 
inform the situation outlined above and why this should represent a concern. Several 
points emerge, regarding the nature, aims and status of current conceptualizations of 
curriculum. Many other considerations identified in the literatures should be studied, 
too, but the following three suffice here, at least for the time being. 
Nature of curriculum 
A first point is about the nature of curriculum. Dominant perceptions tend to ignore 
the fact that the concept of curriculum may be variously understood, depending on a 
person’s perspectives and form of thinking. One perspective sees the world and the 
people who occupy it as in the final stage of development: it is assumed that today is 
the accumulation of all its yesterdays – we have reached the endgame. This perspective 
is informed by a particular way of thinking that sees this moment as working towards 
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closure. According to Berlin (2012) (in his essay ‘The hedgehog and the fox’), this is 
a view held by hedgehogs, who focus on one big idea only. A different perspective 
sees the world and its inhabitants as in a stage of constant development, a summary 
of all that has gone before and that forms the beginning of the next moment: this is a 
view held by foxes, who are nimble on their feet and understand that every question, 
every situation, requires a different response. From this perspective, experience is 
seen as a continual process of unfolding, a process of new beginnings in working with 
knowledge and in the writing of life texts (Said, 1997). It is also rooted in the idea of 
uncertainty, explored by philosophers such as Berlin. Yet this view does not fit with the 
dominant one-directional perspectives of policymakers that aim for certainty, nor does 
it feature to any extent in the literatures of contemporary or historical approaches to 
education or curriculum, or to philosophy itself. Consequently, dominant assumptions 
(not all) throughout the literatures of curriculum research and development are that 
others know what you will learn before you learn it, and that they can specify both what 
you will learn and how you will learn it. These assumptions, in my view, amount to a 
monumental mistake, in spite of their permeating the organization and experience of 
formal education; this idea also informs the thinking behind this article.
Sowell (1987) speaks about these two world perspectives as contributing to 
two visions of reality: a closed vision and an open vision. When the two visions enter 
into an understanding of curriculum, they produce two dominant models. The first is 
understood as a closed field containing a number of objects in the form of concrete 
objectives, manufactured certainty and the delivery of imagined outcomes; the second 
is an open vision that sees possibilities in everything – Goethe’s (1957) vision of the 
original leaf that has the potential to unfold into a flower; the raindrop that becomes 
a flood; the acorn that becomes an oak (Bertoft, 1996). This vision lies at the heart 
of a number of theories and theoretical frameworks, including complexity theory, 
emergence and Bohm’s (1985) view of unfolding meaning in an unfolding universe. It 
may also be seen in Chomsky’s views, especially in Knowledge of Language (Chomsky, 
1986), about the generative transformational nature of language, a view that may be 
brought to an understanding of any aspect of reality. A significant feature is that all 
these approaches celebrate the idea of uncertainty: the aim is not to achieve finality 
but to celebrate emergence into, and engagement with, an unknowable future. 
Aims of curriculum 
The second point is to consider how the aims and purposes of dominant education 
systems are currently theorized and organized as curriculum. The orthodox view, 
espoused by many policymakers (such as those responsible for implementing the 
2013 National Curriculum in England) and traditionalist academics (such as those 
advocating a renewed emphasis on powerful knowledge), is that curriculum is a body 
of those knowledges that people ought to know to function well as socially aware 
human beings, and that will enable them to achieve their goals and realize their values. 
This body of knowledge is compiled, organized and delivered by people operating at 
differently perceived levels of epistemic competence: policymakers include politicians 
and highly knowledgeable theorists, who hand the knowledge down to reasonably 
knowledgeable people such as teachers, who deliver it to utterly non-knowledgeable 
students, who are then required to internalize it. The aim, then, is to persuade the 
students to accept this knowledge as quickly and easily as possible, and to apply it to 
their everyday practices. 
This view is insulting to practising teachers and their students on two counts. 
First, the system represents an abiding commitment to epistemic injustice: a term, 
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coined by Miranda Fricker (2007), which stems from a view that some persons are 
incapable of acquiring or producing knowledge simply because of their heritage or 
cultural–social–historical positioning. People are too often positioned according to 
categorizations of gender, social status or race: see, for example, Gould’s stories in 
The Mismeasure of Man (1992) about the horrendous injustices perpetrated on some 
very bright people by others who hold this view. Second, this autocratic approach 
to curriculum policy and its implied practices places it not too far from the days of 
Bobbitt (1918), who maintained that the curriculum should be seen as the delivery of 
specific knowledges, by identified knowers, with the aim of turning out citizens who 
would act together for what he saw as the common good. Nor is it too far away from 
the efficiency theories of Frederick Taylor, the great promoter of what Callahan (1962) 
called ‘the cult of efficiency’. Further, Taylor held that the practice of curriculum should 
also be policed to ensure that the correct content and form were being delivered. This 
view is thoroughly critiqued today by more thoughtful researchers, such as Au (2012) 
and Apple (1993). Nevertheless, the aim still remains in many places, including the UK, 
of ensuring the achievement by students and teachers of policymakers’ pre-specified 
objectives: the focus is still on the end point of achieving, rather than the ongoing 
experiences of participating (see also Gibson, 1993). 
Status of curriculum 
Higher education is deeply implicated in this view of curriculum and imbues it with 
respectability. Its policy recommendations draw on existing findings from those 
academics whose favourite epistemologies are those of technical rationality and 
whose forms of logic stem from a pursuit of end points, the fulfilment of articulated 
aims as outcomes, and the achievement of certainty: this is one of the most pernicious 
commitments of all. At the same time, little heed is paid to the everyday practical 
theories of teachers, nurses and other professionals in so-called ‘workplaces’ (as if 
Parliament and the university were not workplaces), who are deemed highly competent 
foxes in practical contexts, but not very much so in matters of theory generation. 
This locates the enquiry squarely in the context of challenging what Dewey (1929) 
called ‘the quest for certainty’ and how this plays out in individual classrooms. Here, 
teachers are expected to ‘deliver’ a pre-specified curriculum, whose contents children 
and other learners are expected to accept unquestioningly and learn to reproduce. 
This was the experience of a young student of my acquaintance who reported that in a 
school art lesson he wanted to colour the leaves of a flower red, whereupon his teacher 
corrected him with: ‘No, leaves are green.’ She then took away all the non-green pens 
that were on the table: an example of the acquiescence of teachers who are dominated 
by a requirement to teach to the test, to stay at the level of telling what they know from 
the canon of existing knowledge, rather than communicating how learners can bring 
their own imagination and wonder to the action of creating knowledge and exploring 
it with others. Teachers are persuaded or frightened into abandoning their own love 
of enquiry in light of the fear of being revealed as an outsider or a threat; they comply, 
denying their own calling as educators, denying the idea of teaching as a rich values-
based practice, and promoting instead a view of teaching as a technology. Rather 
than teach according to what students want to learn, and to what they wish to teach, 
teachers are required to abide by the given curriculum of official knowledges, and 
learners are required to learn and apply it (Apple, 1993): we are no further on from 
the days of colonization and the construction of empire. Back to the smooth ground 
of totalitarianism, but now, rather than do it to Julia, as the terrified Winston said in 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (2000), we do it to children. 
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This view/approach is what countless other practising teachers and I disagree 
with, across the sectors of mainstream and further education, and in some corners of 
higher education. It is also the concern of academic authors such as Nixon (2008) and 
Reiss and White (2013) who maintain that schools and other institutions of learning 
should cater for the expressed needs of their students as well as those of elitist 
policymakers. But this also would mean an abandonment of the dominant policy’s 
exclusive focus on achieving certainty, reinforced by dominant forms of research as 
produced by elitist-oriented researchers in higher education. It would mean, as well as 
embracing prescribed forms of technical knowledge, also embracing Polanyi’s (1958) 
knowledge of personal understanding, a reflective level where teachers and students 
can say: ‘I know what I am doing, and I can explain to you what I know, how I have come 
to know it, how I intend to use my knowledge and whose interests that knowledge 
might serve.’ Further, this more reflective approach shifts the ground towards the 
moral considerations of curriculum theory and practice, and away from only the more 
technical aspects.
From all these perspectives, traditionalist approaches to scholarship and 
curriculum research do not serve us well, focused as they are on providing answers 
and solutions, rather than on asking questions or engaging with dilemmas. They focus 
on instrumental forms of knowledge – ‘know that’ and ‘know how’, as set out by Ryle 
(1949). These are the views of Berlin’s hedgehogs: they do not accommodate views 
of personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1958), an understanding of what we need to know 
to find our way creatively and dialogically around a world full of others from different 
contexts and with different traditions. The aim is to achieve certainty and finality; 
the method is to make statements about causes and effects. And these approaches 
continue to be espoused, including dominant approaches to curriculum theory, even 
though their horizons are limited on several counts, including the fact that they adopt 
for curriculum studies what Collingwood (2013) calls ‘a scissors and paste’ approach. 
By this, he refers to historians who first ‘decide what we want to know about and then 
go in search of statements about it, oral or written, purporting to be made by actors 
in the events concerned’ (ibid.: 257). Rather, in Collingwood’s view, the study of history 
(and, in this article, the study and practice of curriculum) should be about asking the 
right questions. Instead of aiming for ‘a logic of propositions’ (that is, statements of 
fact), a search for truth should take the form of ‘a complex consisting of questions 
and answers’ (ibid.: 36–7). Polanyi (1983) thought similarly: in his The Tacit Dimension, 
he challenged a view of the implementation of centrally planned policy as leading 
to specific outcomes, claiming instead that freedom to think was a prerequisite of 
academic freedom and the right to plan futures imaginatively and according to the 
needs of persons. 
This entire situation was well described by Donald Schön (1983: 42), in his 
metaphor of the topography of professional practice landscapes, where, he says: 
There is a high, hard ground where practitioners can make effective use 
of research-based theory and technique, and there is a swampy lowland 
where situations are confusing ‘messes’ incapable of technical solution. 
The difficulty is that the problems of the high ground, however great their 
technical interest, are often relatively unimportant to clients or to the larger 
society, while in the swamp are the problems of greatest human concern.
The question then is: should teachers and other practitioners stay on 
the high ground, dealing with matters of theory, which are relatively 
unimportant for dealing with everyday matters of importance (but are 
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not seen as theory-related), or should they choose to work in the swampy 
lowlands, where the main issues are to do with working with today’s 
problems and finding workable solutions. 
These points are, sadly, matters of fact for today’s reality. However, it is time to adopt 
a more critical perspective, as is the commitment at the heart of action research: if 
a situation leaves something to be desired, other options are needed about how to 
change it. It is then apt to link Schön’s metaphor of the hard high ground and the 
swampy lowlands with one from Wittgenstein, who spoke about the smooth and rough 
ground of practices: while the smooth ground might be found on Schön’s high ground, 
the swampy lowlands represent something rougher. And for Wittgenstein (2009: 46), 
staying too long on the smooth surface of the high ground is threatening and makes 
one lose their purchase on reality: 
We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain 
sense the conditions are ideal but also, just because of that, we are unable 
to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!
But returning to the rough ground also brings challenges and decisions. The task now 
becomes to check one’s own commitments towards the current situation and decide 
whether, if any element is unsatisfactory, what to do about it. It is to highlight the need 
to follow Latour’s (2004) advice and turn matters of fact into matters of concern and 
ask, ‘How can an unsatisfactory situation be changed?’
But returning to the rough ground means wearing practical, theory-lined boots 
because it is littered with stories from experience (see Dunne, 1993). It is then the task 
of educators to listen to the voices of experience and learn about what curriculum 
means for others. Box 1 presents a story from experience to show how and why this 
should be the case.
Box 1: A story of personal experience
This is a story from my mainstream teaching in the secondary sector, a good 
many years ago. I had just returned to the UK from an advisory job abroad, 
enjoying accumulated leave and now thinking, though in a somewhat desultory 
fashion, about getting a job. However, because I had never liked kicking my 
heels, I decided to seek temporary employment in the local school system. At 
that time, it was easy to get a teaching job, and I was quickly hired to teach in 
a local comprehensive school. I was delegated to teach Class 1C (not the real 
name), comprising fourteen 11–12-year-olds, whose favourite game was ‘Get rid 
of teacher’ (probably most schools have a Class 1C). They were awful: full of bad 
language, stupid tricks, very intelligent and bored out of their minds. I couldn’t 
believe they were serious and said so, but they paid no attention and continued 
to make life as miserable as possible for me. I was also very annoyed and told 
them this too, but it just continued. 
I looked for a way to keep them at least entertained and contained, and hit 
on the idea of videotaping them, to appeal to their vanity. They were a vain little 
lot and boasted of their reputation as unteachable. It worked: as well as studying 
specified curriculum topics, we videoed ourselves as much as possible and, 
on those days when the video equipment was not available, used audio tape-
recordings. We got into a regular routine that they would talk about anything 
and record it today, and we would listen to the tape tomorrow. They loved it. 
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A breakthrough happened one day when a key pack-member said, ‘I don’t like 
what I just said. Can I do it again?’, an example, perhaps, of critical reflection. Yes, 
he could: and so we progressed and gradually started to take care about what 
was said. 
They also wanted to do a project that would make them look special in the 
eyes of the school, so a month or so into working together, we decided to make 
a garden. We found a bit of waste ground outside one of the temporary huts that 
acted as a classroom and began. They were very conscientious about getting the 
tools from the school gardener: I made sure everything was returned, not quietly 
disappeared. They discussed what the garden would contain: this involved 
actually looking at books about flowers (exotic ones, according to a unanimous 
vote) and then discussing on site what would suit the ground and climate. They 
also discussed constructing an electric fence to keep off potential intruders from 
other classes; this involved consulting parents and neighbours about materials 
needed. Amazingly we managed to grow a few flowers before the enthusiasm ran 
out and we had to look for a new project. 
What did I learn? I learned that some people refuse to be obedient to 
a given schedule; that it is vital to match the content and delivery to people, 
not the other way round; that independent-thinking people do not cope well 
with a regime of topics that do not meet their immediate needs or interests; that 
curriculum is emergent and needs to begin from where people are and work 
upwards, not begin with an abstract theory and work down. After that it becomes 
a Jacob’s ladder experience of moving between high and low grounds. I learned 
that curriculum is polycentric in nature, as Polanyi (1983) says, as the focus shifted 
to each person as they took the limelight for ideas. I learned that people such 
as Class 1C tend to cultivate their ferocious reputation, so such situations are far 
from epistemically unjust, but suit their self-images. I learned, above all, that Class 
1C were bright, irrepressible and thoroughly good people (except for one who I 
felt was deep-down nasty). I also began to develop many of the ideas that appear 
in this article, about how people decide that and what they want to learn; about 
the futility of imposing an unwanted structure on people’s learning; about the 
poverty of the practice of leading horses to unwanted water, be that water ever 
so pure and sanitized. Class 1C were indeed awful, and I liked them enormously. 
And later study brought me into contact with those philosophers and theorists 
who endorsed this view, the theoretical and lived impulse behind the dominant 
quest for certainty and the need to abandon it. 
Yet views about practice-based theory and person-centred curricula run on to a 
different kind of rough ground when they meet up with dominant views about what 
knowledge should be taught, how this might be done, and how the knowledge should 
be used. Donald Schön made this point, too, in 1995: he was referring to a ‘scholarship 
of enquiry’ or ‘the new scholarship’ found in Boyer (1990), which argued for a form 
of teaching that would encourage enquiry learning. A curriculum based on this view 
would involve:
 • a ‘scholarship of integration’, the putting together of isolated facts across 
disciplines and putting them into a relevant context 
 • a ‘scholarship of application’, an understanding of how knowledge might be 
applied to relevant problems
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 • a ‘scholarship of teaching’, which begins with what the teacher knows, and 
means ‘not only transmitting knowledge but transforming and extending it as 
well’ (Schön, 1995: 27). 
According to Schön (ibid.), abiding by these criteria would involve teachers doing 
‘a form of action research, with norms of its own which will conflict with the norms 
of technical rationality’, a form of knowledge that focuses on instrumental aspects. 
And given that technical rationality is still widely acknowledged as the preferred 
form of knowledge of the modern research university, and therefore by default 
permeates  received theories of curriculum, it conflicts with what is widely held 
as teachers’ practice-based knowledge. Schön said that this would lead to an 
epistemological battle, but it would be a: ‘battle of snails’, ‘proceeding so slowly that 
you have to look very carefully to see it going on. But it is happening nonetheless’ 
(ibid.: 32). 
Yes, it is happening, with action research. It is usually held to have started in the 
1940s, with the work of Kurt Lewin and others, working in the US (although it actually 
began much earlier than that with the work of scholars such as John Dewey in the 
US and Reg Revans in Wales); and then, in the UK, developed apace in the 1970s 
through the work of Lawrence Stenhouse and John Elliott. Their view was that teachers 
and students could research together in action how to improve what they were doing 
and use their knowledge for social benefit. The rationale for the work was throughout 
grounded in an enquiring approach, an attitude of not-knowing and wanting to find 
out. A key feature also was the idea of critique: if a situation was unsatisfactory, it could 
be changed. Both Stenhouse and Elliott encouraged teachers to find ways actively to 
use the power of critique for developing new ways of teaching to encourage learners 
to learn according to their own strengths. This in turn involved their teaching young 
people how to critique and to implement strategies for creating the kind of world in 
which they wished to live. The work was highly successful, and it had lasting implications 
for how curriculum might be theorized (Elliott, 1998) and for their ideas about teachers 
as researchers. 
However, serious questions arise about the potential of action research for 
sustainable school and curriculum development. While the views of Stenhouse 
and Elliott about ‘teachers as researchers’ did prove highly influential at the time, 
and remain so to this day, it needs to be remembered that there is a big difference 
between content (‘the what’) and process (‘the how’). Although, at the time, action 
research was shown to be powerful as a process, especially for those in direct 
contact with learning contexts, it was never mainstreamed by policymakers as an 
equal partner, simply because dominant approaches maintained control over the 
content of curriculum and promoted it as a set of approved knowledges, which itself 
required a specific objectives-focused form of teaching. Further, the 1980s saw the 
establishment of a systematic policy of increasing control on schools and curriculum 
and form of research, by the then and later governments, including key members 
of the intelligentsia. And action research itself became a casualty in this drive: it 
is well documented how, since the 1980s, it was co-opted and mainstreamed in a 
form that suits dominant policy orientations (Herr and Anderson, 2005; McNiff, 2014). 
Thus, a nascent revolution in terms of establishing teachers’ freedom to consult with 
their learners about what they wished to learn for their own imagined futures was 
put down by officialdom; all things curriculum remained firmly under the control of 
officially legitimized knowers. Back to the sure smooth ground: back to the certainty 
of a closed form of thinking.
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What can be done about it?
Notwithstanding, experience shows that it is possible to challenge officialdom and 
get away with it, if certain strategies are developed: a core feature here is the idea 
of teachers doing action research together, with the aim of initiating systemic social 
change, but this in turn requires an understanding of processes of social change. 
A grounding point is that sustainable forms of systemic social change cannot be 
imposed from outside: it begins in the individual mind, in that people decide to 
change themselves: while short-term change might be imposed, as when we need to 
go on a crash diet to reduce weight for an important event, systemic change is that 
which is undertaken voluntarily and intentionally, not imposed, as when we decide to 
maintain a healthy diet for a durable life. Initiating sustainable systemic change then 
means working with like-minded colleagues and encouraging others to do the same. 
This sees the beginning of processes of exponential growth: one person can exercise 
influence in the thinking of another, to an nth degree, and they in turn do the same for 
others: the effects are potentially boundless. It is also an example of an open mentality 
that is grounded in people’s adopting an enquiry approach, rejecting certainty and 
embracing the uncertainty of an unknowable future. 
However, to achieve sustainable change, people themselves need to see 
the potentials of their research for taking politically oriented action for changing 
systems, with implications for systematized action research, where people are able 
to observe and change an objective matter of practice while also observing and 
changing the system of which they are a part  –  we simultaneously initiate a local 
process and thereby become part of what turns into a wider process: the whole 
becomes greater than the sum of its parts. This is what can happen when individuals 
work with others in doing action research: it becomes a norm, a sustainable culture 
based on a commitment to improve local practices for wider systemic influence. 
I learned this from local episodes such as with Class 1C, and later saw the same effect 
through initiating wider processes of sustainable social change in Ireland and South 
Africa (see McNiff et al., 2000). 
It is possible to initiate the same process in relation to curriculum, and so 
influence policy. At a local level, learners, teachers and interested others such as 
parents come together, on an equal footing, to negotiate, develop and test ideas 
about what learners need to learn in order to lead the kind of life they wish to 
live; teachers, parents and others do the same. They research their own situations, 
individually and collaboratively, and find ways of improving any unsatisfactory 
aspects, with a view to improving processes of education locally, and then, 
collectively, using their new knowledge to influence others, including policymakers. 
And people power really does exercise powerful influence: look at the examples 
of movements initiated by figures such as Jesus, Gandhi, Martin Luther King and 
Lewin, and of educators such as Freire, Dewey, Stenhouse and Elliott. All had a 
vision of what could be, and all were prepared to abandon the security of expecting 
a definitive outcome, having faith in an unknown future, and acknowledging the 
inevitable fallout in facing up to systems of power. If sufficient people shout their 
disapproval of current systems and insist on change, change will eventually happen 
(see also Arendt, 1990).
And it is happening, worldwide, as shown in multiple action research-oriented 
texts (for example, Meredith 2020, among others). However, it still needs to be 
developed further in the curriculum literatures, specifically in relation to the following 
points:
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 • A curriculum should be understood as a dynamic, negotiated process, with full 
acknowledgement that different participants come from different perspectives, 
and social and knowledge traditions, which must be respected and recognized 
(see also Berlin, 2012). 
 • Successful participation involves a willingness to try things out, anticipating that 
such efforts may or may not be possible or produce hoped-for results, and what 
might then be seen as the necessary conditions for its success.
 • A view of research as a non-specialized everyday practice of finding out that 
which is not yet known, available to all and enabling anyone to be seen as a 
researcher in their own right (see also Appadurai, 2006).
 • A willingness to listen to the other, and appreciate their perspectives, the 
inclusion of all, and the right of all to speak and be heard.
What might be the significance of this approach to 
curriculum studies?
Many of the ideas in this article are drawn from study in other mainstream fields, 
such as complexity theory, epistemology and philosophy, as well as from personal 
experience, as the example in Box 1 shows. What is not so prominent in the literatures – 
or, indeed, in public discourses about the ‘best’ form of knowledge that should be 
communicated and endorsed in formal organizational contexts – is the issue of what 
form the knowledge should take, what it should be used for and whose interests this 
might serve. At the moment, the form of knowledge most promoted is one of facts and 
figures, underpinned and informed by a myopic but arrow-straight aim for certainty. 
Yet this desire for certainty is what has got us into trouble throughout history. Some 
philosophers and theorists rail against its evils. Dewey (1929), for example, wished to 
abandon ‘the quest for certainty’, as did Popper (2002), who spoke about ‘the poverty 
of historicism’, an understanding that events will follow a predetermined course; also 
Isaiah Berlin – see his ‘The pursuit of the ideal’, reproduced in The Crooked Timber of 
Humanity (2013), and his ‘Notes on prejudice’, written in 1981 and reproduced in the 
New York Review of Books in 2001. All pieces contain dire warnings from history about 
the penalties of a commitment to an unshakeable belief that one particular way is the 
right way, whether that way takes the form of a creed, social commitment or obedience 
to a policy directive. Berlin (2001) writes, as part of a hurried note to a friend:
Few things have done more harm than the belief on the part of individuals 
or groups (or tribes or states or nations or churches) that he or she or they 
are in sole possession of the truth: especially about how to live, what to 
be & do – & that those who differ from them are not merely mistaken, 
but wicked or mad: & need restraining or suppressing. It is a terrible and 
dangerous arrogance to believe that you alone are right: have a magical 
eye which sees the truth: & that others cannot be right if they disagree.
This commitment to certainty, he says, leads to persecution and totalitarianism, justified 
by a belief that one has the correct knowledge, and that it is one’s responsibility to 
communicate it to others and enforce it where necessary. 
This rightness of an attitude towards certainty is widespread in educational policy 
documents across the developed world. It is also critiqued in contemporary critical 
literatures, by, for example, Foucault (2002) and Chomsky (2000); in educational policy 
literatures, such as by Ball (2012); and in cognate disciplines such as critical discourse 
analysis (Gee, 2005). All have, in their own way, raised sceptical questions about a 
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commitment to an epistemology of certainty. However, the idea has not yet been 
developed in the literatures of curriculum study or in action research. One of the reasons 
could be that, although many scholarly articles are written by theorists who have taken 
uncertainty as their epistemological base – a commitment to pluralism and inclusion 
that colours their entire world view – others have not, and these include traditionalist 
academics and curriculum theorists, such as those who advocate randomized control 
trials in education, who tend to choose to revolve their moral universe around the 
idea of certainty itself. Further, these days, given the systematic drive by neo-liberal 
governments to merchandise and therefore corporatize education, and the resolve of 
many universities to stay on the right side of those governments, these traditionalist 
academics are now in the majority. Theirs remains the dominant view that informs 
legitimized forms of curriculum, in spite of the fact that a road to certainty usually 
leads to nowhere, without any purchase on reality. And what might it take to accept 
that routes often lead into the rough swampy lowlands of practice, where just as much 
of value is to be learned as on the high grounds of abstract knowledge? What price 
curriculum, if it gives us information but does not serve us well in understanding how 
to hold our knowledge lightly? And, above all, learn to say, like Cromwell in his letter 
to the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland, who refused to accept his authority: 
‘I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken.’ 
To the best of my knowledge, not too many literatures are available to show 
the processes involved when people come together to undertake collective politically 
oriented action research in relation to influencing policy in terms of what should count 
as a curriculum that could shape the future, and are then prepared to make their 
findings public – with perhaps some notable exceptions. One is Margaret Meredith 
(2020), working with educators around the globe, with abundant evidence to show 
the processes involved. Another is in the work of Claire Collins, in a further education 
context, who develops projects whereby teachers, learners and policymakers come 
together to decide matters of the nature, form and content of curriculum, also with 
abundant evidence (see McNiff, 2020). There must be thousands more. These need to 
be understood as a coherent body of literatures with a clear social intent: to break free 
from the constraints of certainty and explore the potentials of developing an unbounded 
approach to politically oriented action research for curriculum development. Nothing 
less will do. 
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